'Whenever the object studied is Man and not 'Whenever the object studied is Man and not man as a species of animal, we find that psychoman as a species of animal, we find that psychopathology comes to be not only a kind of biology pathology comes to be not only a kind of biology but also one of the Humanities.' but also one of the Humanities.'
In an important editorial in the In an important editorial in the British British Journal of Psychiatry Journal of Psychiatry, Kendell suggested , Kendell suggested that the practice of dichotomising illness that the practice of dichotomising illness into mental and physical categories is 'arinto mental and physical categories is 'archaic and deeply misleading' and 'incompachaic and deeply misleading' and 'incompatible with contemporary understanding of tible with contemporary understanding of disease' (Kendell, 2001: p. 492 ). Kendell disease' (Kendell, 2001: p. 492 ). Kendell argued that since the various taxonomies argued that since the various taxonomies of mental disorder are essentially a list of of mental disorder are essentially a list of conditions treated by psychiatrists, it is a conditions treated by psychiatrists, it is a matter of pragmatism whether (for exammatter of pragmatism whether (for example) Alzheimer's disease is classified as menple) Alzheimer's disease is classified as mental illness and treated by a psychiatrist, or tal illness and treated by a psychiatrist, or as a physical illness and treated by a neuroas a physical illness and treated by a neurologist. In sanctioning this approach Kendell logist. In sanctioning this approach Kendell was reiterating the claims made by Carl was reiterating the claims made by Carl Gustav Hempel, who after articulating his Gustav Hempel, who after articulating his celebrated deductive-nomological model celebrated deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation (Hempel & Op- of scientific explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948 ) went on to crucially influpenheim, 1948) went on to crucially influence the development of the ence the development of the Diagnostic Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and Statistical Manual (DSM) classifica-(DSM) classifications of mental illness in his 1959 landmark tions of mental illness in his 1959 landmark paper, 'Fundamentals of taxonomy' (see paper, 'Fundamentals of taxonomy' (see . .
In a related and equally important In a related and equally important article, also in the article, also in the British Journal of British Journal of Psychiatry Psychiatry, Cheng furthered the cause of , Cheng furthered the cause of scientific psychiatry by expressing the scientific psychiatry by expressing the opinion that 'cultural variation in mental opinion that 'cultural variation in mental health is mainly in the presenting features health is mainly in the presenting features rather than in the nature and frequency of rather than in the nature and frequency of the the underlying underlying [my italics] neuropsychiatric [my italics] neuropsychiatric impairments and disorders' impairments and disorders' (Cheng, 2001: p. 3) . He suggested that an approach that p. 3). He suggested that an approach that recognised the pathoplastic effects of recognised the pathoplastic effects of culture on illness behaviour and the exisculture on illness behaviour and the existence of culture-general psychopathology, tence of culture-general psychopathology, while at the same time respecting the biolowhile at the same time respecting the biological basis of mental illness, was feasible gical basis of mental illness, was feasible providing that 'standardised diagnostic inproviding that 'standardised diagnostic interview [s] . . . incorporated psycholinguistic terview [s] . . . incorporated psycholinguistic equivalents from different cultures' (Cheng, equivalents from different cultures' (Cheng, 2001: p. 3) . In articulating these opinions 2001: p. 3). In articulating these opinions Cheng was echoing the intention of the Cheng was echoing the intention of the architects of the architects of the International ClassificaInternational Classification of Diseases tion of Diseases (ICD) and DSM classifica-(ICD) and DSM classifications to create a transcultural scientific tions to create a transcultural scientific psychiatry. psychiatry.
Kendell and Cheng are not saying exKendell and Cheng are not saying exactly the same thing, but both are promotactly the same thing, but both are promoting a scientific psychiatry, the details of ing a scientific psychiatry, the details of which go almost unquestioned within the which go almost unquestioned within the profession. It is, however, possible to cast profession. It is, however, possible to cast doubt on the validity of their views by condoubt on the validity of their views by considering an alternative approach to the sidering an alternative approach to the mental which is much discussed in the philmental which is much discussed in the philosophy of mind, language and anthropolosophy of mind, language and anthropology, and with which most psychiatrists ogy, and with which most psychiatrists are unfamiliar. The approach in question are unfamiliar. The approach in question can explain two things: first, why the discan explain two things: first, why the distinction between mental and physical illness tinction between mental and physical illness is a necessary and unavoidable one, and is a necessary and unavoidable one, and second, why the claim that mental illness second, why the claim that mental illness is the same in all cultures is an implicit asis the same in all cultures is an implicit assumption, rather than an empirical finding, sumption, rather than an empirical finding, in Cheng's cross-cultural psychiatry. in Cheng's cross-cultural psychiatry.
MENTAL SCIENCE MENTAL SCIENCE
The alternative to the views of Kendell articulates the events articulates the view that there is a categorical difference view that there is a categorical difference between the mental and the physical and between the mental and the physical and that there cannot, in any useful sense, be a that there cannot, in any useful sense, be a science of the mental because of the imposscience of the mental because of the impossibility of either strict psychological or sibility of either strict psychological or strict psychophysical laws. Against psychostrict psychophysical laws. Against psychophysical laws, Davidson argues that mental physical laws, Davidson argues that mental and physical concepts have different condiand physical concepts have different conditions of application or 'constitutive princitions of application or 'constitutive principles' and that 'there cannot be tight ples' and that 'there cannot be tight connections [psychophysical bridge laws] connections [psychophysical bridge laws] between the realms if each is to retain between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence' allegiance to its proper source of evidence' (Davidson, 1970: p. 222 ). On the nature (Davidson, 1970: p. 222 Physical theory, on the other hand, 'proPhysical theory, on the other hand, 'promises to provide a comprehensive closed mises to provide a comprehensive closed system guaranteed to yield a standardised, system guaranteed to yield a standardised, unique description of every physical event unique description of every physical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law' couched in a vocabulary amenable to law' (Davidson, 1970: pp. 223-224) . In the light (Davidson, 1970: pp. 223-224) . In the light of these different commitments the exisof these different commitments the existence of psychophysical laws must tence of psychophysical laws must a priori a priori be impossible. If they did exist, such laws be impossible. If they did exist, such laws would have the intolerable effect of transwould have the intolerable effect of transmitting the conditions of application bemitting the conditions of application between the mental and the physical, with tween the mental and the physical, with the result that either irrational thought the result that either irrational thought and behaviour would violate the laws of and behaviour would violate the laws of physics or the mental would be constrained physics or the mental would be constrained by physical constitutive principles in a way by physical constitutive principles in a way that would breach the norms of rationality. that would breach the norms of rationality. Davidson concluded that 'the nomological Davidson concluded that 'the nomological irreducibility of the psychological means irreducibility of the psychological means . . . that the social sciences cannot be . . . that the social sciences cannot be expected to develop in ways exactly parallel expected to develop in ways exactly parallel to the physical sciences' (Davidson, 1973 to the physical sciences' (Davidson, 1973a a: : p. 230 ). p. 230).
The argument against psychological The argument against psychological laws derives from the view that in the natlaws derives from the view that in the natural sciences the predictive and explanatory ural sciences the predictive and explanatory power of laws can be improved by more power of laws can be improved by more accurately specifying the causal variables. accurately specifying the causal variables. In psychology, on the other hand, there is In psychology, on the other hand, there is no hope of improvement in our everyday no hope of improvement in our everyday way of understanding individuals, because, way of understanding individuals, because, 4 7 2 4 7 2
B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P SYC HI AT RY B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P S YC H I AT RY
( 2 0 0 3 ) , 1 8 2 , 4 7 2^4 7 4 (Davidson, 1973 (Davidson, 1973a . The difficulty with this law is that ). The difficulty with this law is that (as Evnine puts it), (as Evnine puts it), 'whether or not he does eat an acorn is an im-'whether or not he does eat an acorn is an important factor in whether or not we portant factor in whether or not we interpret interpret [my italics] him as wanting to eat one.It is notthat [my italics] him as wanting to eat one.It is notthat his eating or failing to eat an acorn omelette is his eating or failing to eat an acorn omelette is conclusive in determining whether or not he conclusive in determining whether or not he wants to eat one. It is just that the two parts of wants to eat one. It is just that the two parts of the putative law, the antecedent desire and the the putative law, the antecedent desire and the consequent action, both feature in the interpretconsequent action, both feature in the interpretation of an agent and hence are related to each ation of an agent and hence are related to each other as parts of a holistic web' other as parts of a holistic web' pp. 21^22). pp. 21^22).
PHILOSOPHICAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY ANTHROPOLOGY
The remarks quoted above indicate that a The remarks quoted above indicate that a science relying on mental states is implausiscience relying on mental states is implausible. The mention of 'interpretation', howble. The mention of 'interpretation', however, gives an indication of the likely basis ever, gives an indication of the likely basis of an alternative account. The nature of of an alternative account. The nature of interpretation can be informed by a coninterpretation can be informed by a consideration of the theoretical difficulties sideration of the theoretical difficulties encountered in trying to understand the encountered in trying to understand the language and behaviour of individuals from language and behaviour of individuals from other cultures. In its philosophical form this other cultures. In its philosophical form this project amounts to the search for a theory project amounts to the search for a theory of meaning for a foreign language ( of meaning for a foreign language (L L) ) which will consist of axioms and theorems which will consist of axioms and theorems that together give the semantic properties, that together give the semantic properties, the truth-conditions, of the sentences of the truth-conditions, of the sentences of the language concerned. Each theorem will the language concerned. Each theorem will consist of an English sentence that is true if consist of an English sentence that is true if and only if the foreign language sentence is and only if the foreign language sentence is true: for example, ' true: for example, 'il fait chaud il fait chaud ' is true in ' is true in language language L L (in this case French) if and only (in this case French) if and only if it is warm. If a speaker of if it is warm. If a speaker of L L does assent to does assent to the sentence ' the sentence 'il fait chaud il fait chaud' only when it is ' only when it is warm, then one has confirmed the theorem, warm, then one has confirmed the theorem, interpreted the foreign language sentence, interpreted the foreign language sentence, and therefore made a start in constructing and therefore made a start in constructing a theory of meaning for that language. In a theory of meaning for that language. In theory this process is repeated until eventheory this process is repeated until eventually one comes to understand the whole tually one comes to understand the whole of the language in question. of the language in question.
In pursuing the theoretical complexities In pursuing the theoretical complexities of constructing such a theory, Davidson of constructing such a theory, Davidson realised that if the speaker of realised that if the speaker of L L assented assented to the sentence ' to the sentence 'il fait chaud il fait chaud' then this ' then this was not just because ' was not just because 'il fait chaud il fait chaud' means ' means 'it is warm', but also because the speaker 'it is warm', but also because the speaker believed it to believed it to be be warm. Unfortunately, warm. Unfortunately, however -and this is the crucial point -if however -and this is the crucial point -if the speaker of the speaker of L L believes it to be warm believes it to be warm when it is not warm, because the evidence when it is not warm, because the evidence for the truth of the theorem is purely in for the truth of the theorem is purely in have to go on is the fact of honest utterance, we cannot infer the belief honest utterance, we cannot infer the belief without knowing the meaning, and have no without knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the chance of inferring the meaning without the belief' (Davidson,1974: p.142 ). belief' (Davidson,1974: p.142 ).
Ideally, an interpreter needs to be able to Ideally, an interpreter needs to be able to hold an individual's beliefs constant in hold an individual's beliefs constant in order to establish the meaning of that indiorder to establish the meaning of that individual's words; the difficulty is, however, vidual's words; the difficulty is, however, that beliefs require interpretation as much that beliefs require interpretation as much as do meanings. In order to resolve this difas do meanings. In order to resolve this difficulty, Davidson embraced the hermeneutificulty, Davidson embraced the hermeneutical idea that beliefs and meanings are cal idea that beliefs and meanings are internally related, and introduced the 'prininternally related, and introduced the 'principle of charity'. This principle asserts that ciple of charity'. This principle asserts that when one is interpreting someone from when one is interpreting someone from another culture one should assume, without another culture one should assume, without otherwise being able to access an internal otherwise being able to access an internal circle, that they are psychologically similar circle, that they are psychologically similar to and, therefore, believe the same as oneto and, therefore, believe the same as oneself. Davidson writes that this assumption self. Davidson writes that this assumption 'is intended to solve the problem of the interde-'is intended to solve the problem of the interdependence of belief and meaning by holding belief pendence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving for constant as far as possible while solving for meaning. This is accomplished by assigning truth meaning. This is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to alien sentences that make native conditions to alien sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible, accordspeakers right when plausibly possible, according, of course, to our own view of what is right' ing, of course, to our own view of what is right' (Davidson,1973 (Davidson,1973b .
: p.137).
The principle of charity is a way of giving The principle of charity is a way of giving substance to the idea that people from difsubstance to the idea that people from different cultures are psychologically similar, ferent cultures are psychologically similar, and it enables Davidson to resist cultural and it enables Davidson to resist cultural relativism, albeit by an relativism, albeit by an a priori a priori rather than rather than an empirically based argument. an empirically based argument.
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL MENTAL AND PHYSICAL ILLNESS ILLNESS
Informed by the view that a scientific Informed by the view that a scientific approach to mental states is untenable, approach to mental states is untenable, Kendell's arguments in favour of identifyKendell's arguments in favour of identifying mental and physical illness can now be ing mental and physical illness can now be assessed. In terms of aetiology, the claim assessed. In terms of aetiology, the claim that mental illness can have physical causes that mental illness can have physical causes is not enough to sustain Kendell's claim. is not enough to sustain Kendell's claim. The physical symptoms of illness are The physical symptoms of illness are presumably related to underlying physical presumably related to underlying physical causes by laws that can be sharpened as causes by laws that can be sharpened as science improves our knowledge of the physcience improves our knowledge of the physical universe. In the case of mental sympsical universe. In the case of mental symptoms, since there are no laws there is no toms, since there are no laws there is no such hope, and there is no reason whatsosuch hope, and there is no reason whatsoever to think that knowledge of the pheever to think that knowledge of the phenomenology of mental illness will improve nomenology of mental illness will improve beyond its current state. This, in fact, is beyond its current state. This, in fact, is the main reason why -despite enormous the main reason why -despite enormous progress in terms of the scientific underprogress in terms of the scientific understanding of physical illness in the last censtanding of physical illness in the last century -Jasper's tury -Jasper's General Psychopathology General Psychopathology remains unsurpassed. remains unsurpassed.
The different constitutive principles of The different constitutive principles of the mental and physical give reason to the mental and physical give reason to think that not all mental illness think that not all mental illness has a physihas a physical cause. Physical symptom-concepts have cal cause. Physical symptom-concepts have physical conditions of application, whereas physical conditions of application, whereas mental symptom-concepts, particularly mental symptom-concepts, particularly those of minor mental illness and personathose of minor mental illness and personality disorder, have broadly rational conlity disorder, have broadly rational conditions of application; they relate to ditions of application; they relate to individuals' other beliefs, desires and individuals' other beliefs, desires and actions in a normative way that cannot be actions in a normative way that cannot be captured by a theory that is formulated in captured by a theory that is formulated in a physical vocabulary. For example, the a physical vocabulary. For example, the application of the concept of 'misattribuapplication of the concept of 'misattribution', which is likely to prove aetiologically tion', which is likely to prove aetiologically important in somatisation disorder (Butler important in somatisation disorder , requires a prior familiarity , 2001), requires a prior familiarity with the normative constraints of belief with the normative constraints of belief formation. However, as Margolis reminds formation. However, as Margolis reminds us, us, 'atthe presenttime, nearly the whole of late 20th 'atthe presenttime, nearly the whole of late 20th century philosophy is quite unable to provide century philosophy is quite unable to provide any principled criteria of reality testing which any principled criteria of reality testing which are not obviously theoretically, historically, ideoare not obviously theoretically, historically, ideologically, culturally and locally skewed. (Margolis,1994: pp.124^125) . (Margolis,1994: pp.124^125 ).
The absence of a principled relation beThe absence of a principled relation between mental symptoms and underlying tween mental symptoms and underlying physical causes coupled with the normative physical causes coupled with the normative nature of the mental means that the diagnature of the mental means that the diagnosis of mental illness will, even if it is secnosis of mental illness will, even if it is secondary to an identifiable physical cause or ondary to an identifiable physical cause or illness, always have to be based on an illness, always have to be based on an assessment of the phenomenology. There assessment of the phenomenology. There are, of course, mental illnesses that result are, of course, mental illnesses that result from physical causes at a level with suffifrom physical causes at a level with sufficiently general effects as to be amenable ciently general effects as to be amenable to physical intervention. Neurologists can, to physical intervention. Neurologists can, in principle, compete with psychiatry over in principle, compete with psychiatry over the management of these disorders in a the management of these disorders in a way Kendell presumably envisages -but way Kendell presumably envisages -but only after mental state examinations have only after mental state examinations have provided them with diagnoses. Furtherprovided them with diagnoses. Furthermore, even if it did turn out that all people more, even if it did turn out that all people with a given mental illness such as depreswith a given mental illness such as depression had a given neurophysiological state sion had a given neurophysiological state in common, one could not sanction giving in common, one could not sanction giving them a physical treatment without deferthem a physical treatment without deferring to a mental state examination. ring to a mental state examination.
INTERPRETATION AND INTERPRETATION AND CULTURE CULTURE
Cheng's views inherit the difficulties just Cheng's views inherit the difficulties just mentioned since, in the absence of an mentioned since, in the absence of an identifiable physical basis, the identifiable physical basis, the cultureculturespecificity or otherwise of mental illness specificity or otherwise of mental illness becomes that of legitimately identifying becomes that of legitimately identifying cross-cultural psycholinguistic equivalents. cross-cultural psycholinguistic equivalents. The discussion of interpretation implied, The discussion of interpretation implied, however, that to find such equivalents an however, that to find such equivalents an interpreter interested in mental illness is reinterpreter interested in mental illness is required to assume precisely what Cheng sets quired to assume precisely what Cheng sets out to prove, namely that mental illness is out to prove, namely that mental illness is the same in all cultures. In other words, the same in all cultures. In other words, without making the assumption that 'unwithout making the assumption that 'underneath' linguistic and conceptual differderneath' linguistic and conceptual differences different cultures really are talking ences different cultures really are talking about the same thing, how can one ever about the same thing, how can one ever be sure that one's interpretations are be sure that one's interpretations are accurate? The matter is, incidentally, comaccurate? The matter is, incidentally, complicated significantly by the decision to plicated significantly by the decision to allow the existence of 'culture-specific allow the existence of 'culture-specific illness behaviour' : p. 1). illness behaviour' (Cheng, 2001: p. 1) .
In resting on the assumption of someIn resting on the assumption of something like the principle of charity, the thing like the principle of charity, the viability of cross-cultural psychiatry, like viability of cross-cultural psychiatry, like anthropology in general, comes at a high anthropology in general, comes at a high price. Although the principle ostensibly price. Although the principle ostensibly enables cultural relativism to be avoided, enables cultural relativism to be avoided, it achieves this at the cost of converting it achieves this at the cost of converting what Cheng would construe as primarily what Cheng would construe as primarily empirical into an interpretative enterprise. empirical into an interpretative enterprise. The principle of charity, which is essentially The principle of charity, which is essentially an injunction to assume that other inan injunction to assume that other individuals are psychologically the same as dividuals are psychologically the same as oneself, can hardly function as a fundaoneself, can hardly function as a fundamental scientific principle on which to mental scientific principle on which to erect a science of cross-cultural psychiatry. erect a science of cross-cultural psychiatry. Furthermore, if these views are right, Furthermore, if these views are right, the enormous amount of time and effort the enormous amount of time and effort that goes into 'finding' psycholinguistic that goes into 'finding' psycholinguistic equivalents should be interpreted, not as equivalents should be interpreted, not as evidence of empirical rigor, but rather (as evidence of empirical rigor, but rather (as Husserl might say) as reflective of the infiHusserl might say) as reflective of the infinite nature of the task. This is in some ways nite nature of the task. This is in some ways reassuring, because it carries the implicareassuring, because it carries the implication that the work of psychiatry -unlike tion that the work of psychiatry -unlike that of physical medicine, or indeed science that of physical medicine, or indeed science in general -will never be complete. in general -will never be complete.
Having conceded that the project is Having conceded that the project is interpretational, it might be advisable to interpretational, it might be advisable to go the whole way and admit that the disgo the whole way and admit that the distinction between mental illness and the tinction between mental illness and the associated illness behaviour is at best associated illness behaviour is at best vague, and following Margolis, embrace vague, and following Margolis, embrace some form of cultural relativism. It is likely, some form of cultural relativism. It is likely, however, that over the coming years crosshowever, that over the coming years crosscultural psychiatrists will become increascultural psychiatrists will become increasingly reluctant to concede this issue, as they ingly reluctant to concede this issue, as they are better able to identify psycholinguistic are better able to identify psycholinguistic equivalents. However, if other cultures equivalents. However, if other cultures continue to be exposed to Western ideas continue to be exposed to Western ideas at the current rate, then the requirement at the current rate, then the requirement for the principle of charity will gradually for the principle of charity will gradually recede as cultures come to resemble each recede as cultures come to resemble each other. If this occurs -and one may reasonother. If this occurs -and one may reasonably assume that it will -then it will not ably assume that it will -then it will not indicate that cross-cultural psychiatry has indicate that cross-cultural psychiatry has come of age, but rather support the implicit come of age, but rather support the implicit claim of this editorial, that psychiatry has claim of this editorial, that psychiatry has more in common with politics than with more in common with politics than with medicine. medicine.
